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Key points

The adoption and the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) among the EU Member States lead to observe that it no longer makes sense to distinguish between UCITS and non-UCITS schemes. 
This conclusion can be reached by interpreting the rationale behind the AIFMD and by analysing the definition of AIF (alternative investment fund). In fact, due to the broad scope of this new legal definition, each undertaking for collective investment that is non-UCITS now falls inside the new AIF category.
It follows that currently the distinction to be made is the one between UCITSs and AIFs, because from the EU legislation perspective tertium non datur.
Additionally, according to the internal regulations of the EU Member States it is also possible to distinguish within the AIF category between AIFs for retail investors and AIFs reserved for professional investors.
The same classifications can be used within the UK, where it is possible to establish: 1) UCITSs, such as authorised unit trust schemes (AUTs) and authorised open-ended investment companies (OEICs), which have to be managed according to the UCITS Directive; and 2) AIFs, i.e. every UK collective investment undertaking which is not compliant with the rules of the UCITS Directive. The UK alternative investment funds can be addressed to retail investors or reserved for professional investors on the basis of the marketing choices made by their managers. 
1. Introduction

This article aims to discuss the usefulness of the distinction between the categories of UCITS​[2]​ and non-UCITS schemes​[3]​, within the regulation of asset management​[4]​. The purpose is to understand whether this distinction still makes sense after the adoption and the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive​[5]​ among the Member States, from the  EU​[6]​ and UK​[7]​ regulation perspective​[8]​.
UCITSs, meaning Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, are open-ended retail investor funds established according to the provisions of the UCITS Directive​[9]​. This Directive represents one of the first initiatives of the EU legislature to create a single market for financial products. In this regard, the Directive harmonised the EU Member States internal regulations on the funds and the management companies. In particular, the Directive regulates the working structure of these funds. Accordingly, UCITSs must have a depositary who holds the fund’s assets in order to grant more protection to the investors and a separate management company. The Directive also sets forth some relevant limits of investment and in borrowing in order to protect the retail investors, given that these funds have been created in order to satisfy particularly the needs of these investors. This harmonisation represents the legal basis of the European Passport Regime. The passport is a legal instrument of great importance because it allows the managers of UCITSs to market freely their funds to every kind of investor within the EU territory. This means that these funds may be marketed on a cross-border basis in every EU Member State in the same way as domestic retail funds.
The UCITSs must operate on the principle of risk spreading and are required to redeem units on demand.
On the contrary, non-UCITS schemes do not represent a legislative category, but just a non-homogeneous group of different types of undertakings for collective investment joined together by the fact that they are not UCITS Directive compliant​[10]​.
On the basis of this classification, in the UK, authorised funds can be subdivided into three categories for promotion purposes: UCITS schemes, non-UCITS retail schemes (NURSs) and qualified investor schemes (QISs). All the authorised funds other than UCITS schemes are termed non-UCITS schemes​[11]​.

2. The adoption of the AIFMD

With the adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, the EU legislature decided to regulate, for the first time at Union level​[12]​, the activities​[13]​ of management​[14]​ and marketing​[15]​ to professional investors​[16]​ of alternative investment funds. 
However, in doing so it decided not to regulate the funds themselves, which continue to be subject to the internal rules of each Member State and under the supervision of the national Authorities​[17]​. In fact, the legislature preferred just to provide the definition of alternative investment funds, without regulating them, in order to easily identify their managers which are–instead–subject to the new EU rules. In other words, due to the legal definition of alternative investment funds, now it is possible to recognise both them and their managers, i.e. the real “recipients” of the AIFMD provisions​[18]​. 
In order to achieve its goal, the AIFMD created and defined​[19]​ two new legal categories: (1) “alternative investment funds” (AIFs), and (2) “alternative investment fund managers” (AIFMs), which will be discussed below. 
The aim of the AIFMD is to establish “common requirements governing the authorisation and supervision of AIFMs in order to provide a coherent approach to the related risks and their impact on investors and markets in the Union”​[20]​ and “to provide for an internal market for AIFMs and a harmonised and stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for the activities within the Union of all AIFMs …”​[21]​. From this perspective, the intention of the EU legislature is to implement and harmonize at EU level the regulations on the management and marketing of alternative investment funds and the cross-border supervision of them. In other words, given that in Europe these activities were regulated, if at all, just at the national level, it seemed necessary to create a new unique EU legislative framework​[22]​.
It is also worth noting that, due to the Directive, the opportunities for the management companies (both EU and non-EU) to carry out said activities in other Member States have increased. Consequently, even the regulatory harmonisation and the transnational supervision on these financial entities have increased in order to make the new cross-border business perspectives really effective and grant more protection to the EU investors.

3. The structure of AIFs under the AIFM Directive

The AIFMD defines the AIFs as “collective investment undertakings, including investment compartments thereof, which: (1) raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors; and (2) do not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC”​[23]​. It is important to note that the definition itself mentions the UCITS Directive so that the AIFs would qualify. It follows that a collective investment scheme that is not authorised under the UCITSD is an AIF. Therefore, the category of the AIFs is very broad and comprehensive, given that it can include every undertaking for collective investment with whatever legal form and whatever structure that is not authorised under the UCITS Directive.
 Furthermore, according to Article 4, paragraph 1.b) of the Directive, AIFMs are legal persons whose regular business is managing one or more AIFs​[24]​. 
Recital 6 of the AIFMD states that “the scope of this Directive should be limited to entities managing AIFs as a regular business–regardless of whether the AIF is of an open-ended or a closed-ended type, whatever the legal form of the AIF, and whether or not the AIF is listed–which raise capital from a number of investors with a view to investing that capital for the benefit of those investors in accordance with a defined investment policy”​[25]​. 
The legislative approach used in the AIFMD shows some similarities with the one characterizing the UCITS Directive​[26]​, particularly, with regard to the working structure of the AIFs. In fact, it is built on the basis of the so called “investment triangle model”, characterising the Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, where the three corners are represented by: (1) the investors, (2) the asset manager, and (3) the depositary-custodian, with the fund itself that is in the centre​[27]​. This means that the asset manager decides the investment strategies and the depositary holds the assets on behalf of the fund​[28]​ in order to grant more protection to the investors​[29]​. 
Therefore, at the European legislation level, the “investment triangle model” now is the only available model for every collective investment scheme addressed both to retail and professional investors.

4. The UK regulation on collective investment schemes

	The UK legislature transposed into the internal system the AIFMD by issuing the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013​[30]​ that, in particular, introduced for the first time in the domestic legislation the new legal categories of AIFs and AIFMs, created by the Directive, and amended a number of other acts, including the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (RAO 2001).
Regulation 3 of the AIFM Regulations 2013 provides the same definition of AIF​[31]​ included in the AIFMD. However, it is interesting to note that Regulation 2 adds some new concepts. In particular, it states that 1) authorised unit trust schemes, 2) authorised contractual schemes and 3) authorised open-ended investment companies can be authorised AIFs and, additionally, it defines the UK AIFs as AIFs which are authorised AIFs, or are not authorised or registered in an EEA State, but have their registered office or head office in the United Kingdom. 
These clarifications are useful to relate the different UK categories of collective investment schemes (with their subcategories) with the new EU category of AIFs. The result is that in UK it is possible to establish: (1) authorised AIFs which are UK authorised CISs and (2) unauthorised AIFs, such as, for example, UK UCISs with registered office or head office in this jurisdiction. 
In fact, in the UK there are four main categories of CISs with some subcategories, so it is possible to distinguish among: (1) authorised open-ended investment companies under FSMA 2000 section 236 (OEICs); (2) authorised unit trust schemes under FSMA 2000 section 237 (AUTs); (3) overseas recognised schemes under FSMA 2000 sections 264​[32]​, 270​[33]​ and 272​[34]​; and (4) unregulated collective investment schemes (UCISs).  
The schemes of the first two categories (i.e. OEICs and AUTs) are subject to the release of an authorisation order by the FCA and can be established as retail schemes or as schemes reserved for qualified investors (so called qualified investors schemes or QISs). Differently, the schemes of the third category (i.e. overseas recognised schemes), as constituted abroad, need to be simply recognised in the UK by the FCA, in order to be offered to the general public. Finally, those of the fourth category, as unregulated, do not need any authorisation from the FCA. 
QISs, according to COLL 8.1.4.(1)​[35]​, are authorised funds which are intended only for professional clients and for retail clients who are sophisticated investors and high net worth investors​[36]​. For this reason they have a more relaxed set of rules governing their operation and in particular their investment powers than for retail schemes​[37]​. This means that they can invest in any specified investment named in the FSMA 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, in real property, in precious metals and commodities​[38]​.
UCISs, instead, are CISs which have not any authorised or recognised status. Therefore, they are not generally subject to rules limiting their investment freedom. As a consequence, they cannot be promoted to the general public but only to certain types of qualified and sophisticated investors according to COBS 4.12​[39]​ and to the exemptions laid down in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes) Exemptions Order 2001 (PCIS Order)​[40]​.
Therefore, UCISs are neither subject to the release of an authorisation order by the FCA nor the limits of investment and in borrowing laid down in the FCA Handbook COLL​[41]​.
The lesser regulatory requirements of these two schemes (i.e. QISs and UCISs) regarding their investment policy and their supervision are the reason why they cannot be offered to the general public, namely to all the types of investors, particularly retail investors​[42]​. In other words, given that their units or shares can be risky financial products, as their managers are not subject to the legislation regulating the other retail CISs, FCA decided to ban their selling to investors without financial skills.






5. The potential investors in CISs

It is also important to analyse the investment possibilities of investors according to the UK regulation, since these contribute to the shaping of the different types of CISs​[43]​.
	In doing so, it is useful to look at the client’s categorisation made by the FCA in its COBS Handbook: (1) retail clients, (2) professional clients, and (3) eligible counterparties. 
	A retail client is a client who is not a professional client or an eligible counterparty​[44]​, but the same FCA has distinguished within this category among​[45]​: (a) sophisticated investors​[46]​, (b) high net worth investors​[47]​, and (c) ordinary retail investors​[48]​.
The category of the professional clients is comprised of: (a) per se professional clients​[49]​ and (b) elective professional clients​[50]​.
Finally, within the category of the elegible counterparties it is possible to distinguish between: (a) per se eligible counterparties​[51]​ and (b) elective eligible counterparties​[52]​. 
In view of the rules of the FSMA 2000 and the ones issued by the FCA in COBS 4.12, as amended in 2014​[53]​, it is possible to argue that all kinds of investor can invest in AUTs, OEICs and recognised schemes, whilst the investors who can invest in QISs and UCISs are only: (1) retail clients who are sophisticated investors, both certified sophisticated investors and self-certified sophisticated investors​[54]​, (2) retail clients who are high net worth investors​[55]​, (3) professional clients, and (4) eligible counterparties. Consequently, it follows that ordinary retail investors cannot invest in QISs and/or UCISs, as these financial products can be too risky and complex and therefore inappropriate for them​[56]​.
This legislative and regulatory approach provides a balanced solution by banning the investment in risky financial products (such as units or shares of QISs and UCISs) only to those investors who lack the capability to understand their complexity and their riskiness​[57]​. At the same time, it seems to be able to attract investors from abroad. In fact, foreign sophisticated investors and high net worth investors, who could be banned in investing in collective investment schemes similar to UK QISs or UCISs under the laws of their countries, could find in this jurisdiction a broader variety of financial products to buy. For this reason, the UK legal framework has to be positively evaluated because it is able both to protect investors needing to be protected​[58]​ and to offer more investment opportunities to professional, rich and sophisticated investors needing to diversify their investments as much as possible. 

6. The relationship between UCITSs and AIFs at EU level

	Upon a closer examination of the EU regulation, it suggests that the broad scope of the definition of AIF provided by the AIFMD highlights the real intention of the EU legislature in including every collective investment undertaking that is not compliant with the UCITS Directive​[59]​. The EU legislature, by defining the AIFs so broadly, in fact, wanted to create a residual category of undertakings for collective investments inside which to place any scheme that is not compliant with the UCITS Directive. In other words, in the UCITS category there are all the EU CISs managed according to the rules laid down in the UCITSD. This means that these schemes are subject to very strict limits in investing and in borrowing given that they have been created to be sold to retail investors. Differently, in the AIF category there are all the schemes which do not comply with the limits in investing and borrowing according to the UCITSD. Just for this reason they cannot be considered as UCITSs and they are necessarily AIFs.
	The rationale behind the setting of the AIFMD reasonably leads us to observe that, from the EU legislation perspective, now there are only two categories of undertakings for collective investment, namely UCITSs and AIFs. This means that, at EU level, tertium non datur.

7. The relationship between UCITSs and AIFs at UK level

With regard to the UK system, only AUTs and OEICs can be established as UCITS schemes benefiting from the UCITS European passport​[60]​. On the contrary, every other UK scheme cannot be established as “passported” UCITS. It follows that schemes such as UCISs and QISs cannot qualify as UCITSs at all. At the same time, also AUTs and OEICs can be established without complying with the UCITS Directive, and in this case they cannot be considered as UCITSs, i.e. they can be promoted and sold in the UK also to retail investors but they cannot be passported into other EU Member States on the basis of the UCITS passporting rights. However they can use the AIFMD passport to access the market of other EU countries. 
Therefore, if the rationale behind the definition of AIF is to include in this category every scheme that is not UCITS Directive compliant, looking at the UK regulation, it is possible to argue that every scheme, other than AUTs and OEICs established according to the rules of the UCITS Directive, has to be considered as a UK AIF. 
By contrast, if it is true that every type of UK scheme belonging to all the above mentioned categories can be established as AIF, it is important to remark that funds, falling into the categories of the unregulated collective investment schemes (UCISs) or qualified investors schemes (QISs) will be necesarilly considered as UK AIFs, as well as AUTs and OEICs not complying with the UCITSD. As legal effect, they cannot benefit from the UCITS Directive passport, but they can benefit from the European passport under the AIFMD, allowing them to be offered just to professional investors in other Member States​[61]​.

8. Concluding remarks

	Hence, for all these reasons, it is important to stress that the distinction to be made is the one between UCITSs, on one side, and AIFs, on the other. This is achieved by interpreting the rationale behind the definition of AIF provided by the AIFMD, which is to consider an AIF to be every collective investment scheme not compliant with the UCITS Directive​[62]​. From this point of view, at EU level, tertium non datur, given that each collective investment scheme can be established as a UCITS or as an AIF dependent on the business model chosen by its manager​[63]​, but whatever is not a UCITS is an AIF.
It is also relevant to distinguish between AIFs for retail investors and AIFs for professional investors​[64]​. Accordingly, it is possible to establish both AIFs for retail investors and AIFs reserved for professional investors. In other terms, under the AIF classification many non-homogeneous funds can be included, some of them suitable for retail investors and others not. This is why currently it seems more appropriate to classify schemes as: (1) AIFs for retail investors as those schemes that were referred as non-UCITS for retail investors (so called NURS)​[65]​ before the adoption of the AIFMD and (2) AIFs reserved for professional investors, such as unregulated collective investment schemes and qualified investors schemes under the UK law.
	In the light of the above considerations, it is possible to conclude that from the EU perspective, after the adoption and the implementation of the AIFMD, it does no longer makes sense to distinguish between UCITS and non-UCITS, because whatever is not-UCITS now falls inside the new AIFs category. 
	All this means that the “not particularly scientific distinction”​[66]​ between UCITSs and non-UCITSs now can be replaced by the legislative distinction between UCITSs and AIFs.
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